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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


24 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Criteria Regarding Release of National Intelligence
Estimates to Foreign Governments

1. General Samford and General Breitweiser have recently raised several questions regarding the criteria used in connection with the release of National Intelligence Estimates to friendly foreign governments. At the request of the Director, the Board of National Estimates has studied this problem. A summary of the Board of National Estimate's findings and a copy of the letters forwarded by General Samford and General Breitweiser are attached.

2. The attached memorandum will be placed on the USIB agenda for noting at the meeting of 7 July.



Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates

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NSA review completed

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24 June 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Criteria Regarding Release of National Intelligence
Estimates to Foreign Governments

1. A survey of release practice to date indicates that, within the fairly explicit limitations and restrictions on re-
lease laid down in existing directives,^{*} the Director and USIB have "normally" released a significant number of estimates, notably those concerned with the Bloc. Over the past four years,

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* NSCID 1, Para. 5, the Presidential Directive of 23 September 1958, and Tab C, IAC-D-115/1, 8 April 1958.

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2. In practice, most NIEs appear to have provided few if any problems for the USIB on the release issue. ^{*} Provided they met certain legal and security requirements laid down in the directives cited above -- or could be made to do so without excessive deletions -- most estimates on the Bloc or other areas where the interests of the US and the recipient government are closely identified have been obvious candidates for release.

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3. The relatively small number of estimates concerning which the release problem has proven difficult are those which do not fall into established patterns of release or non-release or where there may appear to be good reasons for varying from previous practice.

*See Appendix, Basic Data on Release of Estimates, 1955-58

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They usually touch, in peripheral fashion, on US policies or attitudes or upon the attitudes of our allies toward the area in question or toward their position therein. It is possible to suggest various hypothetical considerations which might apply in a given case. Having canvassed a series of possibilities, however, we are convinced that the relevant criteria can be fully identified and applied only within the context of the problem at hand and cannot be successfully developed in vacuo. Actually, the views of the USIB as to whether a given estimate of this kind should be released might vary significantly from one time to another according to the particular circumstances. What is essentially involved is a matter of judgment.

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FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

J2DM-148-59
18 May 1959

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The USIB, at its 5 May meeting, discussed at considerable length the [redacted] At 28X6A various times during the discussion we mentioned factors such as [redacted] security," and so on.

I, for one, felt that the members of the Intelligence Board may be using slightly different yardsticks with which to measure the pros and cons of the release of NIEs. I have reviewed Tab C of IAC-D-115/1, dated 8 April 1958, and the documents to which that Tab refers. They are, understandably, quite general in their language; but they do provide a common basis for picking explicit guidelines for judging each specific release proposal.

I therefore believe that it would be useful to make sure there is a mutuality of understanding of the criteria applicable to proposed releases of national intelligence to foreign governments. My suggestion is not for any change in criteria but for a review of them. If you and the other members agree, I recommend we ask the Security Committee of USIB--or other appropriate mechanism--to examine the matter and to report to us their findings.

Sincerely,

ROBERT A. BREITWEISER
Major General, USAF
Director for Intelligence

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Ft. George G. Meade, Md.

6 May 1959

Mr. Sherman Kent
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sherm:

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The discussion yesterday [] appeared to be a discussion of feelings rather than reasons. I wonder if it would be helpful to establish a check list for future discussions. Such a check list might consist of a set of general reasons for not releasing intelligence and a set of general reasons for releasing it.

I suggest the following as being general reasons for not releasing intelligence, either fact or estimate:

First - Release could stimulate action to frustrate our intelligence activities either generally or discreetly.

Second - Release could make it possible for some power to frustrate action responsive to the intelligence.

Third - We are ashamed of the quality of the intelligence being considered for release.

Fourth - We would be embarrassed directly in future associations to have our frank views known, or our activities known.

[]

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I would suggest the following as being general reasons for releasing intelligence:

First - Release could stimulate action to aid our intelligence activities, possibly through supply of additional information or access.

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Second - Release could make it easier to pursue "combined" action or defend "unilateral" action responsive to the intelligence.

[REDACTED] 25X1

Fourth - We might desire to give highly persuasive evidence of complete intelligence cooperation. 25X1

25X6 25X6A [REDACTED] Applying this check list to the matter of releasing [REDACTED] I would argue that:

There would be no stimulus to frustrate our intelligence.

There might be some possibility of [REDACTED] 25X6X6
US action which might be responsive to the estimate and thereby being in a better position to oppose such action if they chose.

The quality of the estimate is good enough so that we need not feel ashamed to release it [REDACTED] 25X6X6

25X6 25X6A [REDACTED] We would not be embarrassed in any future associations with [REDACTED] by the frankness of our views [REDACTED] The [REDACTED] 25X6
[REDACTED] 25X1

25X6 It is possible that we might be embarrassed and might lose friends if our release to [REDACTED] 25X6X6
[REDACTED] however such a leak would be most unlikely.

25X1 It is possible that [REDACTED] would be stimulated to aid our intelligence if [REDACTED] showed any obvious lack unknown to us. 25X6X6

It is probable that some "combined" actions or some "unilateral" US actions responsive to the intelligence might be easier to pursue.

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The release would further emphasize our policy of intelligence cooperation.

There is no concern about face to face frankness with the subject country in this instance.

A recap of the check gives two possible disadvantages, both only remotely possible, and three advantages one of which is considered probable. This method would seem to argue strongly for release to

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/s/

JOHN A. SAMFORD
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

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